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panel data models reveals that contagion--a high degree of real integration and financial
interdependence among countries--is a core explanation for recent emerging market crises. The model
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INTRODUCTION
Many economists have started to concede in recent years that contagion and self-fulfilling beliefs of
investors have played a crucial role in the emerging market financial crises of the 1990s.
1 Despite the
progress on the theoretical side, however, empirical models of currency crises have been shown to
perform poorly (Berg and Pattillo 1998) and many economists and policy institutions have been
struggling to develop adequate models to predict future financial crises (Kaminsky et al. 1997, Goldstein
et al. 2000).
Much of the empirical literature on financial crises, however, still focuses on country-specific
macroeconomic factors and has ignored or at least underestimated the importance of contagion--the
possibility that the origin of a crisis may lie in the occurrence of a crisis elsewhere in the world rather than
with weak domestic fundamentals. As a consequence, economists still lack the answer as to why many
crises of the 1990s clustered within regions and affected a broad range of countries almost
simultaneously. In other words, the question that remains is how and why crises occurring in different
economies are linked and interdependent.
The aim of this paper is to help find an answer to this question. The use of a non-linear Markov-
switching model, based on the seminal work by Hamilton (1989, 1990), is suggested in order to enable a
systematic comparison of three competing explanations for financial crises: weak economic
fundamentals, sunspots--exogenous shifts in agents’ beliefs--and contagion. Contagion in this paper is
defined as the transmission of a crisis that is not caused by the affected country's fundamentals (although,
of course, the transmission has an impact on the country's fundamentals ex post) but by its ''proximity'' to
the country where a crisis occurred.
The paper suggests and develops a new methodology to measure three types of ''proximity'', or
channels of contagion. The first one measures the real interdependence among economies through trade
competition. A second one analyzes to what extent countries are competing for bank lending in third
markets. And the third channel measures the degree of stock market integration across countries.
The paper then conducts three complementary tests on the relative importance of fundamentals,
contagion and sunspots. First, the use of Markov-switching models reveals that country-specific
                                                          
1 For instance, Krugman (1999, 8-9) admits: “[T]he power of contagion in the last two years settles a long-running
dispute about currency crises in general: the dispute between 'fundamentalists' and 'self-fulfillers'. ... I hereby
capitulate. I cannot see any way to make sense of the contagion of 1997-98 without supposing the existence of
multiple equilibria, with countries vulnerable to self-validating collapses in confidence, collapses that could be set
off by events in faraway economies that somehow served as a trigger for self-fulfilling pessimism.” (bold added).
The collection of papers in Agenor, Miller, Vines and Weber (eds., 1999) provides a compelling overview of the
controversies surrounding financial crisis.2
fundamentals generally fail to explain the timing as well as the severity of financial crisis in individual
countries. Including contagion in the model, however, improves the explanatory power of the model
significantly in most cases and even eliminates the need for regime shifts in the Markov-switching
framework for some countries. Second, a panel data analysis confirms the robustness of these results
for a sample of 24 open emerging markets. The results suggest that the Latin American crisis in
1994-95 and the Asian crisis of 1997 spread across emerging markets not primarily due to the
weakness of those countries' fundamentals but rather to a high degree of financial interdependence
among affected economies. Third, the model’s ability to predict the Asian crisis is tested. It is shown
that taking contagion factors into account would have permitted quite an accurate prediction of countries
to which the crisis spread. Overall, these results emphasize that only if we take into account the systemic
character of financial crises will we be able to improve our understanding and better predict
 the occurrence of future crises.
The paper starts by briefly reviewing the literature on contagion. It then develops the
Markov-switching model and discusses its underlying assumptions. Data definitions and the contagion
methodology are then outlined. The empirical results for the Markov-switching and panel data
models follow. Finally, the paper concludes by outlining some general policy implications.
RECENT LITERATURE ON CURRENCY CRISES AND CONTAGION
The question of how to define the term contagion is still a controversial one. Contagion in this paper is
defined in the following way:
2
Contagion is the transmission of a crisis to a particular country due to its real and
financial interdependence with countries that are already experiencing a crisis.
On the contrary, other authors, like Forbes and Rigobon (1999), adopt a narrower definition in which
such interdependencies need to intensify during crises, and the increase may not be related to similarities
in fundamentals across countries in order to constitute contagion. To understand and evaluate these
differences in definition, one needs to analyze the different transmission channels of currency crises.
They can be grouped into three categories: financial interdependence, real interdependence, and
                                                          
2 This definition follows one of the earliest papers on the issue of contagion by Calvo and Reinhart (1996), who call
spillovers due to interdependence “fundamentals-based contagion” and other spillover channels, for instance through
herd behavior, “true contagion”.3
sunspots--exogenous shifts in agents’ beliefs.
Financial interdependence across countries can have at least two different causes. First, a crisis
may be transmitted due to direct financial linkages--the fact that financial institutions may have large
cross-border holdings. Second, indirect financial linkages, in particular the presence of a common lender
and decisions by institutional investors, have received a lot of attention in recent years. A crisis in one
country may induce the common lender to call loans and refuse to provide new credit, not just to those
countries that have already experienced a crisis but also to other countries, thus spreading the crisis
across countries (Van Rijckeghem and Weder 1999, Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000, Caramazza, Ricci
and Salgado 2000).
Similarly, institutional investors may be forced to withdraw funds not only from a crisis country
but also from other markets in order to raise cash for margin calls and to rebalance portfolios (Goldfajn
and Valdes 1997, Calvo 1998, Kodres and Pritzker 1999). Analyzing data on country funds, Frankel and
Schmukler (1998), for instance, find evidence that herding behavior and institutional factors were partly
responsible for the spread of the Mexican crisis in 1994-95 to other emerging markets.
Real interdependence can either be explained through bilateral trade or through trade competition
in third markets. A crisis in one country is more likely to spread to another economy if the two have a
large degree of bilateral trade (income effects) or are strong competitors in third markets (price effects)
because the latter economy loses competitiveness and thus can not avoid devaluation. Gerlach and Smets
(1995) provide a theoretical model analyzing these links, while Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996),
Glick and Rose (1999), and Fratzscher (1998) find some empirical evidence for the importance of real
linkages in spreading recent crises across markets.
Exogenous shifts in investor beliefs (or sunspots) are usually attributed to herd behavior in
financial markets. Shifts in investor beliefs are exogenous in the sense that they are neither related
to country-specific or common fundamentals nor to interdependencies across economies. Calvo
and Mendoza (2000) show how herding can be rational as the globalization of financial markets
reduces the incentive for investors to collect first-hand information and encourages them to follow
common investment strategies. A related argument by Goldstein (1998) is that a crisis in one country
may constitute a “wake-up call” for investors to reassess fundamentals in other countries, thus
raising the degree of financial market comovements and possibly spreading the crisis across
economies.
Some of the literature has defined only this third type as contagion and referred to the first two of
these categories as merely interdependence or spillovers (e.g. Forbes and Rigobon 1999, Masson 1998).4
However, whatever terminology one may chose to adopt, it should be emphasized that the central goal of
this paper is to analyze whether the normal degree of real and financial interdependence across economies
during tranquil periods (included in the definition of contagion in this paper) can help us understand and
predict countries to which a crisis will spread and whether it can explain the crisis’ severity.
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY: LINEAR INFECTION FUNCTIONS AND
NON-LINEAR MARKOV-SWITCHING VAR MODELS
Infection Function: Fundamentals versus Contagion
The most commonly used empirical model in the literature is to pin down the role of country-specific
economic fundamentals in causing currency crises by using a linear function of the form
t i t X i t i u x y , 1 , ' + + = − β α  (1)
with yi,t as a measure of currency crises in country i, xt-1 a vector of fundamentals and βX as the vector of
coefficients. Economists have been trying hard to test an ever wider range of fundamentals and to raise
the number of crises under consideration in order to increase the explanatory power of their models.
However, as Berg and Pattillo (1998) show convincingly, the explanatory power and in particular the
predictive power of such models have remained small.
One reason for the poor performance of fundamentals-based models is that fundamental causes of
currency crises may differ sharply across countries and across crises episodes, thus making it extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to find a single set of fundamentals underlying all crises. However,
fundamentals-based models have tended to ignore one important element that has been common to many
financial crises of the 1990s: the almost simultaneous occurrence of crises in various countries. What this
suggests is that recent crises may contain a strong systemic element in that they may have been
transmitted due to the countries’ financial and real interdependence rather than their economic
fundamentals. To formalize this hypothesis, the following linear infection function is defined
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with yj,t measuring the severity of a crisis in country j and REALij and FINij indicating the degree of real
and financial interdependence between economies i and j. Thus, this infection function allows for two
sources of a crisis: weak economic fundamentals xt-1 and contagion.
The important feature of this infection function is that it allows exchange market movements yj in
all countries j to influence the pressure on the home currency yi. The extent to which the home economy i
is affected by exchange market movements or crises in other countries j depends on its degree of real
integration (REALij) and financial interdependence (FINij) with these economies. It should be emphasized
that both integration parameters are time-invariant and are measured during tranquil periods in order to
account for the possibility that integration may intensify during crisis periods, i.e. in order to ensure that
the integration variables are exogenous in the model.
Unlike many other papers on contagion, the infection function of equation (2) explicitly
incorporates cascading effects, i.e. the possibility that shocks may be transmitted not only from a single
country where a crisis originated, but also from other countries that were affected subsequently. Given the
systemic nature of many currency crises of the 1990s, such as in the ERM in 1992-93, in Latin America
in 1994-95, in Asia in 1997-98 and through Russia in 1998, it seems imperative to explicitly allow and
test for such cascading effects.
Markov-switching VAR Methodology
It is crucial to emphasize that finding statistically significant coefficients from models (1) or (2) does not
necessarily imply that these models provide a satisfactory explanation of crises. Indeed the fit of a model
with fundamentals and contagion may still be poor despite finding some significant coefficients. An
important shortcoming of the linear infection function of equation (2) is that it ignores the possibility that
changes in expectations and private sector beliefs, which are explained neither by fundamentals nor by
contagion, may also be the cause of a crisis or at least exacerbate it (Calvo and Mendoza 2000, Goldstein
1998). It is extremely difficult, however, to develop a proper empirical test for the role of changes in
investors’ expectations because determinants of these changes (such as herd behavior, fund managers’
incentives or beliefs about future fundamentals) tend to be unobservable.
Due to the unobservable nature of changes in expectations (or sunspots), I employ a non-linear
Markov-switching VAR (MS-VAR). The MS-VAR model used here is based on the one first developed
by Hamilton (1989, 1990) for the analysis of US business cycles.
3 The basic rationale for using an MS-
                                                          
3 See also Kim and Nelson (1998), Krolzig (1997), and Diebold, Lee and Weinbach (1994) for a thorough
theoretical discussion of Markov-switching VAR models and different empirical applications.6
VAR methodology for the analysis of currency crises is that it allows a comparison of the role of
observables (fundamentals and contagion variables) with the importance of unobservable factors
(sunspots). If unobservable factors in the model are dominant, then the observable factors in the model are
not very useful in explaining crises. If, however, the MS-VAR model shows that observable variables are
more important than unobservables by eliminating regime shifts due to unobservables, then the model
may be a good one in explaining and anticipating currency crises.
4
The starting point for the MS-VAR model is the observation that the parameters Ω of a VAR
process may not be time-invariant, as assumed by standard OLS models, but that they vary over time.
More precisely, the MS-VAR model makes a very specific assumption about the behavior of the
parameters Ω of the system: Ω are time-invariant as long as a particular regime prevails but they change
once the regime changes. With M as the discrete and finite number of feasible regimes st, the conditional
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where Yt-1 is the set of past observations of the vector yt, Ωm is the VAR parameter vector for regime
m=1…M, and f (.) describes the density function of the normal distribution.
The question that arises now is what constitutes the regime-generating process, i.e. what
determines which regime st prevails at any one point in time. If the timing of switches across regimes
were observable, one could easily solve this problem by using indicator functions and appropriate
dummies to condition the system. However, for the analysis of exchange rates it is not clear when and
whether regime switches occur. In other words, in the framework of equation (2) it is not clear whether
movements in the exchange rate (the dependent variable) are due to changes in observables (contagion
and fundamentals) or due to unobservables (sunspots).
Therefore, the regime-generating process is assumed to follow an unobservable Markov chain
with transition probability pkl of the form
                                                          
4 The use of Markov-switching regimes models to analyze foreign exchange markets is still rather new. Martinez-
Peria (1998), Gomez-Puig and Montalvo (1997) and Engel and Hakkio (1994) estimate a Markov-switching model
for ERM currencies. Jeanne (1997) and Jeanne and Masson (2000) find that a Markov-switching model with two
regimes performs better for the French franc in 1987-93 than a linear OLS estimation.7
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where pkl is the probability of being in regime k in period t if the regime l prevailed in period t-1. The
Markovian chain of equation (4) therefore states that the probability of being in state k in period t is solely
dependent on which regime prevailed in the previous period t-1. Accordingly, the Markovian transition

































so that every row describes a different state k in period t and each column stands for a different regime l
in t-1. An important further condition for the Markov chain to describe the regime-generating process is
that there is no absorbing state, i.e. there is no pkl s.t. pkl = 1.
So far, the assumptions underlying the regime-generating process of the system have been
described. We now need to specify the assumptions underlying the data-generating process of the VAR
process. In its most general form the VAR process of order p [MS(M)-VAR(p)] for any given regime st can
be written in state-space form as
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with  ut ~ NID (0,IK).
As the MS(M)-VAR(p) model of equations (6) and (7) illustrates, exogenous regime switches can
have four separate origins: changes in the intercept v, in the autoregressive coefficients A, in the mean,
and in the error variance Σ (heteroskedastic errors). For empirical applications, it is often useful to allow
only for some of the parameters of the model to be conditioned on the state of the Markov chain while
other parameters are regime-invariant. Due to the restricted number of time-series observations and thus
the limited degrees of freedom, I model exogenous shifts in beliefs as switching intercepts vi and changes
in the error variance Σ.
5
Extending equation (6) in order to also include a set of exogenous fundamentals and contagion
variables in the spirit of the infection function of equation (2), the state-space form of the Markov-
switching model of order p=1 for country i becomes:
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where st indicates the state in period t, and ui,t ~ NID (0,IK). The reformulation of the linear infection
function of (2) as a non-linear Markov-switching model of (8) therefore enables us now to distinguish
between and empirically test for three causes of currency crises: weak fundamentals, contagion, and
sunspots.
6 Equation (8) is the benchmark equation to be used in the empirical analysis in the remainder of
the paper.
                                                          
5 See Krolzig (1997, 1998) for a thorough discussion of the specifications of alternative types of regime shifts.
6 It should be noted that one important model assumption is that regime switches reflect changes in expectations that
are unrelated to fundamentals or contagion. In other words, sunspots solely reflect unobservable factors. A potential
problem with this assumption is that in reality, of course, sunspots may reflect unobservable fundamentals or
contagion factors. The empirical investigation of these and other issues will be addressed below.9
Building on the methodology developed by Krolzig (1998), the Markov-switching model is
implemented empirically by applying the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm, programmed in Ox.
With this, maximum likelihood estimates for the regime-switching models can be obtained.
DATA AND DEFINITIONS: CURRENCY CRISES AND CONTAGION
Since the central objective of this paper is to analyze the question whether contagion has played a role in
the recent emerging market crises, the focus of the empirical analysis is exclusively on 24 open emerging
markets, as defined by the IFC plus some transition economies, for the period 1986 to 1998.
7 The reason
for choosing this sample and time period is that contagion and crises can affect countries only where
capital flows are relatively free and markets are relatively open.
Definition of Currency Crises
The two most commonly used measures of currency crisis yi,t have been based on a binary definition in
which a currency crisis is defined only if the change in the exchange rate is larger than two or three
standard deviations in a particular period (e.g. Frankel and Rose 1996) or have been defined as continuous
exchange market pressure (EMP), which is a weighted average of the changes in the exchange rate e, the
interest rate i, and the foreign exchange reserves R:
) ( )) ( ( ) ( , , , , t i t US t i t i t R i i e EMP ∆ − − ∆ + ∆ = ψ ϕ η (9)
with i and iUS as the domestic and US interest rates, respectively, ∆ as the change of a variable, and η, ϕ,
ψ as weights.
8
The intuition for using this measure is that when facing pressure on its currency, a government
has the option of either devaluing the currency, raising interest rates and/or running down reserves. Hence
EMP is a fairly good proxy for the strength of the pressure against the currency regime. Importantly, it
also captures speculative attack episodes that fail to cause a devaluation. Since the aim of this paper is to
understand not only the timing of a crisis but also its severity, this continuous definition will be used in
the estimations below.
                                                          
7 See the appendix for a list of the 24 countries, data sources and also for the definitions of included fundamentals.
8 Each of the three measures is weighted by its relative precisions, calculated as the inverse of the series' standard
deviation in the past. It has been employed in various studies of currency crises, including Eichengreen, Rose and
Wyplosz (1996) and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996).10
Defining Real Integration Contagion
Attempts to measure real transmission channels for financial crises have been undertaken by Glick and
Rose (1999), Caramazza, Ricci and Salgado (2000) and Fratzscher (1998). These papers find some
evidence that trade linkages may have played a role in recent financial crises, although the first two
papers ignore cascading effects, differences in size of countries’ exports as well as the composition of
trade. The measure used here builds on Fratzscher (1998) and attempts to account for these difficulties.
The basic idea to be captured through a measure of real interdependence is that a crisis is more
likely to spread to a country that is competing and trading strongly with countries that have been
experiencing a crisis. Therefore, the importance of country j as a trade competitor for the home economy i
is measured as







































REAL   (10)
The first term indicates the degree of competition of country j for the home economy i in the export
market of commodity c (X
c) in the third market d. The intuition for this measure is that country j is a
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and (b) the higher the share for country i of total exports of that commodity c to region d (
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c
id X X / ). The
second term measures the degree of bilateral trade between the two countries, implying that country i will
be affected more by a devaluation in country j the greater the amount of bilateral trade between them.
The source of the trade data is the World Trade Analyzer, which measures commodities at the 3-
digit SITC level and excludes agriculture and natural resources. Table 1 shows that the degree of real
integration is particularly high for economies of the same region. Due to the large economic size and trade
volume, Southeast and East Asian countries are the strongest competitors outside their own region,
although the degree of competition with these economies is mostly much smaller than with those within
the same region. The degree of trade competition proved robust to the choice of weights between bilateral
and third market trade. Due to the small size of bilateral trade, excluding it from the measure did not alter
the results significantly.11
Defining Financial Integration Contagion
How to measure financial integration contagion is a more difficult and controversial matter. The issue I
am interested in here for the purpose of measuring contagion in the financial sector is how an investment
decision (bank lending and portfolio flows) in one emerging market affects investment decisions in other
emerging markets, i.e. to what extent underlying asset prices and investment decisions are interdependent.
As discussed above, the literature has emphasized two separate channels through which a crisis may be
spread through the financial sector across markets: by the refusal of banks to roll over loans or provide
new funds, and by the decision of investors to withdraw portfolio investments. To capture this distinction,
this section therefore develops two measures of financial integration: one measuring the competition for
bank funds across countries, and the other being based on the correlation of asset returns in equity
markets.
Bank Contagion
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), and Caramazza, Ricci and Salgado
(2000) argue that a crisis is more likely to spread across economies that have the same common lender.
Rather than using a common lender dummy, which is more common in the literature, Van Rijckeghem
and Weder (1999) create a continuous variable that indicates how strongly a country competes for bank
funds with the country where a crisis originated. Their measure, however, uses the same methodology of

















































Latin America 0.357 0.078 0.099 0.013 0.044
Asia: 0.038 0.400 0.499 0.103 0.049
   Southeast & East Asia 0.042 0.413 0.537 0.039 0.041
   South Asia 0.026 0.360 0.382 0.294 0.073
Others 0.037 0.132 0.165 0.034 0.225
Note:   Real Integration for 1996, scaled to lie between 0 and 1.
           Others: Eastern Europe, Middle East, Africa.
Average Real
Integration
Table 1: Real Integration of Regions12
effects and differences in the size of bank lending. To avoid these difficulties, a methodology similar to




















BANKCOMP   (11)
where Fdi indicates the flow of bank loans from lender country d to borrower i. The argument is
analogous to the measure of trade competition above: (a) the higher the share of bank loans received from
country d is for country i, and (b) the larger the share of total bank loans (to emerging markets) that go
from d to country j, the more likely will a crisis be transmitted from country j to country i through lender
d. The explanation is that the more funds a lender d lends to a single country j, the more likely will it be
that if country j experiences a crisis d will be forced to withdraw funds or refuse to roll over debt also to
other economies i. The more heavily country i has borrowed from d, the more strongly will a recall of


















































Latin America 0.478 0.307 0.423 0.076 0.230
Asia: 0.267 0.496 0.698 0.094 0.221
   Southeast & East Asia 0.259 0.541 0.765 0.095 0.213
   South Asia 0.282 0.406 0.564 0.091 0.236
Others 0.304 0.388 0.534 0.096 0.397
Note:   Measure for 1997, scaled to lie between 0 and 1.
           Others: Eastern Europe, Middle East, Africa.
for Bank Loans
Table 2: Competition for Bank Loans
Average Competition13
Table 2 shows the strong regional focus of competition for bank lending and confirms Southeast
Asia as the dominant emerging market region that absorbs a large share of total bank lending to emerging
markets. Finally, it should be noted that BANKCOMPij is an indirect measure of financial linkages,
because it analyzes how a crisis in country j may spread to country i through decisions made by lenders in
country or region d. Data for a direct measure of financial linkages, such as bilateral bank lending, is hard
to obtain for emerging markets, but it is also unlikely to have played a major role as most of the funding
for emerging markets comes from a few developed countries.
Equity Market Contagion
Many emerging markets are not only dependent on bank funds but also on portfolio capital inflows to
finance their demand for foreign exchange. To measure the extent to which the similarity in the
dependence on portfolio flows may have worked as a contagion channel for recent financial crises, I will
employ correlation measures of stock market returns as indicators for the degree of financial market
integration. The underlying hypothesis is that the higher the degree of financial market integration
between two emerging markets, the more likely a financial crisis will spread from one to the other.
Using correlations of stock market returns is certainly not the ideal way and but is an indirect way
of measuring financial integration related to portfolio flows. Including data on direct portfolio flows
would improve the quality of a measure of financial interdependence but are unfortunately not available
for a broader set of countries and for a longer period of time. Nevertheless, using correlations of asset
returns should provide a good first proxy for such financial interdependence. It also has the advantage of
including factors of interdependence that are not directly observable through portfolio flow data.
As a first measure, I use the monthly averages of the correlation of weekly stock market returns
across emerging markets.
9 Since a high correlation of returns may be partly explained by similarities in
fundamentals or by the exposure to common external shocks in developed markets, I control for these
factors by regressing the country return index ri on country-specific fundamentals as well as on weighted
returns of the S&P 500, FTSE 100 and NIKKEI (GRET):
t i t t i t i t i t i t i GRET S P i TB r , 6 , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 1 , µ β β β β β β + + + + + + = (12)
                                                          
9 Baig and Goldfajn (1998) also look at cross-country correlations of exchange rates, interest rates and sovereign
risk spreads during the Asian crisis. None of these three measures is appropriate in the context of this paper because
the first two were a policy tool under managed exchange rates prior to the crisis and sovereign risk spreads reflect
the market perception of the default risk rather than the interdependence of financial markets.14
with the independent variables as the trade balance (TB), the change in a country's interest rate (i), the rate
of inflation (P) and the spot exchange rate (S) for each country i. The second measure of financial
interdependence then is the correlation of the residual µ, which should give a reasonably good idea about
the true interdependence of various emerging stock markets:
10
( ) t j t i ij r r CORREL FINCORR , , , 1 = (13)
( ) t j t i ij CORREL FINCORR , , , 2 µ µ = (14)
Again note that the measures of integration are time-invariant and measured during tranquil
periods in order to ensure that the integration variables are exogenous in the model. Table 3 confirms that
financial market interdependence is significantly higher among regional markets. Two results, however,
stand out from Table 3: first, controlling for global and country-specific factors often raises the degree of
financial interdependence; and second, the residual correlations are particularly high among Southeast
and East Asian markets. This suggests that financial integration contagion is stronger both within regions
and particularly in Southeast and East Asia.
                                                          
10 Wolf (1998) shows that another potential bias, apart from similarities in fundamentals, may result from the
similarity of the sectoral composition of countries’ stock market indices, i.e., if the sectoral composition of two
indices is similar, then it is possible that comovements of these indices are caused by changes in one particular
sector which in turn may be due to global developments. However, Wolf finds that the correlation of returns in many







































































Latin America 0.301 0.349
Asia: 0.147 0.294 0.159 0.165
  Southeast & East Asia 0.131 0.361 0.572 0.179 0.199 0.312
  South Asia 0.173 0.183 0.119 0.472 0.124 0.107 0.122 0.264
Others 0.187 0.100 0.139 0.035 0.233 0.066 0.095 0.100 0.086 0.198
Note:   Correlations are for the period of 1992/Q1-1996/Q4.
           Others: Eastern Europe, Middle East, Africa.
Table 3: Financial Interdependence of Regions
Avg. Return Residual
Correlations: FINCORR1ij Correlations: FINCORR2ij
Avg. Return15
Evaluating and Comparing Different Sources of Contagion
Tables 1-3 above show the degree of integration and interdependence across regions while Table 4 below
ranks the three contagion variables in ten countries. Mexico and Thailand (i.e. the countries that were the
first victims of the Latin American crisis in 1994-95 and the Asian one in 1997) were the strongest real
competitors and had the highest degree of financial integration. Comparing the three different contagion
variables yields a number of important results.
11
First, integration and interdependence have a very strong regional character, with countries of the
same region being much more integrated and competing more strongly with each other than countries of
different regions. Second, Southeast and East Asian countries tend to be the dominant emerging markets.
The reason for this dominance is the larger relative size of these economies, and the greater degree of
openness (both real and financial) of the economies of that region.
Third, Table 4 ranks the countries by integration with Mexico and Thailand. The results are
mostly intuitive and confirm that both Mexico and Thailand tend to be more integrated with countries of
the same region. However, it is striking that the three countries with the strongest degree of real
competition with Thailand and with Mexico were countries that escaped the crises relatively unscathed.
                                                          
11 One potential problem that could constitute a bias in an econometric analysis is the possibility that the different
contagion variables may be highly correlated, if they are picking up similar elements of integration. However, Table
5 (see appendix) shows that the correlation of the contagion variables is low (except for the two stock market
correlation measures), thus there should be no significant bias due to multicollinearity stemming from contagion.
ranking REALij BANKCOMPij FINCORR2ij REALij BANKCOMPij FINCORR2ij
1 Venezuela Peru Argentina Pakistan Indonesia Malaysia
2 Chile Colombia Colombia China Malaysia Philippines
3 Colombia Venezuela Chile Mexico China Mexico
4 Brazil Argentina Malaysia Malaysia India Indonesia
5 Korea Chile Brazil Sri Lanka Korea Korea
6 Thailand Bolivia Venezuela Philippines Hungary South Africa
7 Peru Brazil Philippines Indonesia Philippines Chile
8 Pakistan Philippines Korea India Czech Republic Argentina
9 Argentina South Africa Indonesia Korea South Africa Brazil
10 Malaysia Poland Pakistan Poland Pakistan India
Note: REAL is defined in equation (10), BANKCOMP in equation (11), FINCORR2 in equation (14). Mexico and Thailand are country j in each of
            the equations, therefore the table indicates which countries are the most likely victims based on the strength of the contagion measures.
with MEXICO with THAILAND
Table 4: Comparison of Most Integrated Countries
with Mexico and with Thailand16
This provides a first indication that real integration contagion may not provide a very good explanation or
at least not be the sole explanation for the dynamics of the two financial crises of 1994-95 and 1997.
In contrast, the rankings for the two financial contagion variables correspond much more closely
with the list of countries that became the main victims of either the Latin American crisis or the Asian
crisis, thus suggesting that the crises were more likely to have spread through financial interdependence.
For instance, South Asian markets have a low degree of financial interdependence with Southeast and
East Asia (Table 3) despite having a relatively high degree of real integration with that region (Table 1).
Thus the lack of their financial market integration and financial openness may offer an explanation as to
why contagion did not hit South Asia during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS: EXPLAINING CURRENCY CRISES
To distinguish empirically between the role of contagion and the importance of country-specific
fundamentals and sunspots, a three-pronged testing strategy is followed. First, the univariate Markov-
switching model of equation (8) is employed below to analyze the extent to which exchange rate
movements in emerging markets in the 1990s are explained by contagion versus by fundamentals and
sunspots. Second, a panel data analysis then investigates how robust these results are for a broad sample
of 24 emerging markets. And third, the predictive power of the model is tested.
Contagion Versus Fundamentals in a Univariate Markov-switching Framework
To obtain information about the relative importance of contagion, I proceed in two steps. In the first step,
I exclude contagion from the analysis and compare the linear model of equation (2) with the non-linear
Markov-switching model of equation (8). The idea is that if fundamentals are of key importance in
explaining exchange market movements and currency crises, then its coefficients should be significant
and there should be no need for regime shifts that are independent of fundamentals. In the second step, the
contagion variables are also included to check whether the inclusion of contagion improves the
explanatory power of the model and helps explain the occurrence of currency crises.
Starting with the first step, fundamentals perform modestly in explaining the exchange rate
dynamics of most emerging markets in the 1990s, in particular when large jumps in exchange rates occur
(see Figure 1(a), and regressions 2 of Table 6 in the appendix). On the contrary, the Markov-switching
model with two or three regimes performs well for most countries if the contagion variables are not
included (see Figure 1(b) and regressions 2 of Table 6).17
This finding is intuitively convincing because when looking at the data on exchange market
pressure, one can detect three regimes for most countries: a tranquil one where the exchange market
pressure is around zero; a second one where there is a high degree of exchange market pressure and low
credibility as during times of speculative attacks and crises; and a third one where there is a negative
exchange market pressure, i.e. a currency appreciates, interest rate differentials fall and reserves rise,
which often occurs immediately after devaluations.
Turning to the second step, when including contagion, the coefficients for financial contagion--
and sometimes also for real contagion--are mostly large and significant and the fit of the model is
improved, indicated by the drop in the variances and log-likelihoods (regressions 3 and 4, Table 6). More
importantly, the inclusion of contagion often eliminates the existence of regime shifts, which can be seen
from the fact that the linear model (regressions 3) performs as well as the non-linear Markov-switching
model (regressions 4) for a number of countries. This suggests that contagion in many cases explains
regime shifts that cannot be accounted for by fundamentals.
This finding that regime shifts are eliminated when contagion is included, i.e. the fact that the
linear model of equation (2) performs about as well as the non-linear Markov-switching model of (8), is a
crucial one. It is crucial because it indicates that the factors that explain currency crises, i.e. the regime
shifts, are not unobservable but in many cases are captured through the inclusion of contagion variables.
On the contrary, in cases where regime shifts persist, one cannot make any meaningful inference about
the cause of a crisis because the regime shift in the Markov-switching model is unobservable, i.e. one has
no information about which unobservable factors (e.g. expectations about future fundamentals or
elements of contagion not included in the model) have caused the crisis.18
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Fig. 1(b): Philippines, M=2; No Contagion
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Fig. 1(a): Philippines, M=1; No Contagion
EMP Fitted19
The case of the Philippines provides a good example: a Markov-switching model with two
regimes and no contagion (Fig. 1(b)) performs much better than the linear model (Fig. 1(a)), with the
solid line showing the actual exchange market pressure (dependent variable) and the dotted line in Fig.
1(a) indicating what is explained by fundamentals alone. The linear model with no regime change but
with contagion (Fig. 1(c)), however, performs about as well and thus eliminates the need for regime shifts
that are not due to changes in fundamentals. Note that contagion not only helps to explain the countries’
increased exchange market pressure during the Asian crisis and Latin American crisis but also during
tranquil periods. Similar conclusions apply to some other countries that were victims of either of these
two crises (Korea, Indonesia, Mexico; see Table 6) while contagion does not explain regime shifts for
other countries that were affected less by the crises (Chile, India).
Although there is no single economic fundamental variable that is significant in the analysis for
all countries over time, these findings do not imply that fundamentals are worthless in explaining crises.
For most countries, either the large size of foreign debt, fast domestic credit expansion (“Lending Boom”)
or an overvalued exchange rate is important in understanding movements in foreign exchange markets.
Thus, looking at these three fundamental variables together should indeed improve our understanding of
developments in foreign exchange markets. Nevertheless, not knowing which fundamental variable is
relevant for which country and under what circumstances makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to find
a common explanation for different crises and makes it even harder to predict crises reliably with
fundamentals alone.
A number of robustness checks were conducted. For instance, other fundamentals than those
listed in Table 6 did not prove significant, such as external variables (growth and interest rates in
industrialized countries) and other domestic variables (government deficit, capital flows). It is also
important to emphasize the shortcoming of the Markov-switching methodology of tending to ''over-fit''
the data, i.e. the model with multiple regimes has a good fit but also in some cases produces coefficient
estimates that do not make sense (showing either a large change in the coefficient or the wrong sign).
Otherwise the Markov-switching model appears sound from various test statistics, such as the switching
probabilities pkl. The Markov transition matrices confirm that the probability of remaining in a particular
state is usually about 50% or higher (see Table 6). Only very few regimes are characterized by one or two
events, and most regimes are reached at least three times over the time span of ten or eleven years.20
Contagion Versus Fundamentals in a Panel Data Framework
The key purpose of the panel data analysis is to test whether the results for individual countries outlined
above are robust across countries and whether one can detect factors that were common to the majority of
countries and crisis episodes. In particular, the weakness of the analysis for individual countries is that it
fails to explain why some countries with more healthy fundamentals were affected so severely while
others with worse economic conditions manage to escape unscathed. This subsection presents the results
for a panel data analysis with random effects based on the infection function of equation (2).
12
The key result of the panel data estimation (Table 7) is that contagion has been a key driving
force behind exchange market movements in emerging markets. The primary channel of contagion was
the channel of financial sector interdependence (in particular equity market interdependence), whereas the
coefficient of trade integration is smaller, though still significant. The importance of contagion is
underlined when comparing the Full Model (including both fundamentals and contagion variables) with
the Fundamentals Model (with only fundamentals) and the Contagion Model (with only contagion) and
their log-likelihoods: the Full Model has a much better fit than the Fundamentals Model.
                                                          
12 The ordinary panel data model with random effects or with fixed effects does not explicitly allow for exogenous
shifts in beliefs as the Markov-switching model does. The reason for why an MS-VAR analysis can not be
conducted in this panel data context is that regime shifts across the set of 24 emerging markets are very distinct.
Although comovements and common regime shifts exist for some regional groups, such as in Southeast Asia, no
common regime shifts are present for countries of different regions because there are few similarities across
currencies to be found within regimes. For example, a particular regime may indicate an appreciation and high
volatility for some countries while at the same time showing depreciating currencies and low volatility for others.21
Second, contagion seems to be of particular importance during crisis periods (the 1994-95 Latin
American crisis and the 1997-98 Asian crisis) as indicated by the increase in the size of the coefficients
(regressions 4, 5 in Table 7). There is a particularly strong increase in the coefficient for bank contagion
during crisis episodes, suggesting that decisions by banks to withdraw funds and refuse the rollover of
debt may have played a significant role in the transmission of recent emerging market crises. However,
contagion variables are still relevant during tranquil periods, suggesting that exchange market movements
are transmitted not only during crises.
Third, the fundamentals that are significant are the level of total and short-term foreign debt/GDP,
a prior change in the ratio of domestic credit expansion to GDP (“Lending Boom”), and the overvaluation
of the exchange rate. Many other variables were tested but did not show any significance (such as changes
in the US dollar value vis-à-vis the mark and the yen, a country's government deficit, the current account,
the trade balance).
Finally, the results are robust to changes in variable definitions and the time span but are sensitive
to country groupings. To test for differences across regions, I employ an analysis of variance (ANOVA)
methodology, which takes for each country i, analogously to equation (2), the following form:
t i t i i i t i u z y , 1 , , + + = − γ α (15)
Coef. Std Err. Coef. Std Err. Coef. Std Err. Coef. Std Err. Coef. Std Err.
Capital Flows 0.045 0.046 * 0.085 0.040 * 0.067 0.036
Short-Term Capital Flows 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.001
Lending Boom 7.021 4.808 * 9.124 4.456 5.637 3.984
Foreign Debt ** 10.708 3.827 ** 10.468 3.732 * 7.451 3.549
Short-Term Debt * 4.719 2.373 * 3.150 1.628 * 4.941 1.999
Overvaluation ** 6.225 1.941 * 5.303 1.970 * 3.388 1.722
Reserves -0.559 0.401 -0.531 0.386 -0.246 0.366
Trade Balance 2.141 3.168 3.845 2.871 3.373 2.825
Real Contagion ** 1.741 0.590 ** 1.890 0.623 * 2.575 1.217 * 2.858 1.706
Equity Market Contagion ** 12.864 2.639 ** 13.009 2.774 ** 14.959 4.182 ** 15.923 5.855
Bank Contagion ** 1.139 0.114 ** 1.832 0.659 ** 12.148 3.332 ** 12.308 4.547
Constant ** -4.639 1.391 * -3.362 1.310 -0.401 0.288 ** -4.336 1.185 -0.455 0.350
Log Likelihood
Note: Regressions for "Crisis contagion" include contagion variables only for the crisis episodes of 1994/Q4-1995/Q2 and
          1997/Q3-1997/Q4.     ** and * denote statistical significance of coefficients at the 99% and 90% level, respectively.
Continuous Contagion Crisis Contagion
Table 7: Panel Estimation: Random Effects Model (MLE)
for 24 Emerging Markets Worldwide, 1989/Q1-1998/Q2
FUNDAMENT.
MODEL MODEL MODEL MODEL MODEL
FULL CONTAGION FULL CONTAGION
(5)
-1778 -1296 -1419 -1570 -1956
(1) (2) (3) (4)22
with z as the vector of fundamentals and contagion variables. The null hypothesis of interest is that the
coefficient for an individual country (γi) is equal to the coefficient for the country grouping as a whole
(β):
β γ = i H : 0
The results reveal significant differences in the size and significance for most coefficients across
regional groups. On the contrary, the size of the coefficients for the contagion variables are reasonably
robust within those regional groups as indicated by the acceptance of H0 for usually more than half of the
countries within the same region (Table 8). Another important finding is that financial contagion seems to
have been particularly strong across Asian countries and less significant, though still positive, in Latin
America. On the contrary, the overvaluation of the exchange rate was more of a driving force in Latin
America than in Asia.
Overall, the results of the panel data estimation and its analysis of variance largely support and
strengthen the results of the Markov-switching analysis for individual countries. In particular, while crises
have diverse causes and no single fundamental variable is significant for every country and every time
period, looking at the size of foreign debt, the rate of domestic credit expansion and the competitiveness
of a country together helps in getting a good understanding of the movements in foreign exchange
Global ANOVA Regional ANOVA Regional ANOVA Regional ANOVA
Coef. H0 Coef. H0 Coef. H0 Coef. H0
Capital Flows * 0.085 11 / 24 0.116 4 / 9 0.041 4 / 8 0.042 3 / 7
Short-Term Capital Flows 0.003 11 / 24 0.008 4 / 9 -0.008 2 / 8 0.007 2 / 7
Lending Boom * 9.124 13 / 24 1.107 4 / 9 *  15.71 5 / 8 5.703 3 / 7
Foreign Debt ** 10.46 13 / 24 *  14.54 5 / 9 2.573 3 / 8 *  9.873 3 / 7
Short-Term Debt * 3.150 11 / 24 *  4.431 5 / 9 *  2.968 5 / 8 2.086 2 / 7
Overvaluation * 5.303 10 / 24 0.717 4 / 9 *  8.851 5 / 8 *  4.517 4 / 7
Reserves -0.531 10 / 24 -0.306 3 / 9 -0.514 4 / 8 -1.703 3 / 7
Trade Balance 3.845 9 / 24 7.143 4 / 9 -14.40 2 / 8 1.343 2 / 7
Real Contagion ** 1.741 12 / 24 *  1.971 6 / 9 1.235 4 / 8 0.597 2 / 7
Equity Market Contagion ** 12.86 14 / 24 *  14.56 7 / 9 *  8.384 6 / 8 *  11.41 4 / 7
Bank Contagion ** 1.139 15 / 24 *  1.456 7 / 9 *  1.189 6 / 8 0.938 2 / 7
Note: ANOVA shows how many of the countries' coefficients are statistically equal to their group's coefficient at the 90%
  significance level.  The contagion variables are continuous variables as defined in the infection function of equation (2).
   ** and * denote statistical significance of coefficients at the 99% and 90% level, respectively.
Table 8: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Global Asia Latin America Others
of Panel Estimation for Full Model (EMP)23
markets. But even after controlling for fundamentals, real integration contagion and in particular financial
integration contagion still seem to have played a major role in the foreign exchange markets of many
emerging markets.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS: PREDICTING CURRENCY CRISES
Empirical models of currency crises have been subject to the critique that they are often a “data-mining”
exercise: they test a wide variety of fundamental variables till they find statistically significant results
without knowing whether there really exists a causal relationship between the variables and the
occurrence of currency crises. Berg and Pattillo (1998) confirm this critique by showing that models
which are good in explaining crises ex post have failed to predict the 1997 Asian crisis. The models they
analyze tend to predict crises in countries that were relatively unscathed and often failed to anticipate
crises where they did occur.
13 Therefore, a model that fails to predict crises has very little value for
policy-makers whose aim is to implement policies that prevent or at least lessen the impact of future
crises.
The approach used in this paper is equally open to the data-mining critique. A wide variety of
fundamentals were tested and Tables 6-8 present only those that proved significant in the estimations. The
defense of this approach in this paper is twofold: first, to confirm Berg and Pattillo’s finding that
fundamentals alone fail to predict crises out-of-sample, and second, to analyze whether including
contagion improves the predictive power of the model. The findings confirm that contagion variables are
important not only in explaining but also in predicting the transmission of crises.
                                                          
13 They evaluate and compare the predictive power of three of the most cited models, each representing a different
type of model: Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart’s (1997) signalling approach which identifies when fundamentals
provide signals for potential future crises, Frankel and Rose’s (1996) panel data analysis with probit techniques
reaching back to the 1970s, and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco’s (1996) cross-sectional approach, which focuses on a















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9 shows that the predictive power of the Full Model for the Asian crisis (model 1) is
superior in terms of ranking to all of the models tested by Berg and Pattillo (models 4, 5, 6, 7), based on a
comparison of the Spearman rank correlations. The superiority mostly stems from the inclusion of the
contagion variables in the Full Model because the Fundamentals Model alone does not have a much better
predictive power than the other models by Frankel and Rose (1996) and by Sachs, Tornell and Velasco
(1996), which are both built entirely on fundamentals.
The Full Model does not only forecast accurately the ranking of how strongly countries were
affected by the Asian crisis, but it also performs relatively well in forecasting the degree of severity.
Indonesia and Korea are the only countries for which the Full Model underestimates the degree of the
crises substantially, indicating that fundamentals and the extent of real and financial interdependence did
not seem to warrant the severity with which these countries were hit.
14 The overall results prove robust to
various sensitivity analyses, such as altering the forecasting horizon and using in-sample prediction to test
for parameter constancy, and altering the size of the country sample to check for the impact of individual
countries.
What makes one believe that the model presented in this paper is a superior model? First, the Full
Model presented in this paper has the advantage of being able to estimate both the rankings of countries
as well as the absolute severity of a crisis, i.e. it allows one to understand not only why some countries are
affected more than others, but also why a particular country is hit so severely. Including a time dimension
in addition to a cross-sectional dimension as in the model here has the added advantage of allowing a
better understanding of the dynamics of exchange rate changes. The results confirm that variables that
help explain exchange rate movements during tranquil periods may become even more important during
crises. This was shown to be the case in particular for contagion through bank loan competition among
economies.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has argued that the main reason for the poor performance of standard models of currency
crises lies in their neglect of the role of contagion - the fact that crises may be transmitted across countries
through their interdependence with others. The empirical analysis, using Markov-switching models and
panel data models, found compelling evidence that the Latin American crisis of 1994-95 and the Asian
crisis of 1997-98 were indeed contagious, spreading across countries that were not only vulnerable
economically but also closely linked financially. The model performs remarkably well in predicting the
                                                          
14 Political factors were probably another important reason for why Indonesia was the main victim of the Asian
crisis. Such factors are not analyzed in this paper and are difficult to include on a cross-sectional basis; a discussion
of the role of political factors can be found in Drazen and Masson (1994).26
spread of the Asian crisis. The results therefore suggest that one of the most important indicators for
predicting which countries will be affected by a particular crisis are the degree of real and financial
interdependence with already affected countries.
It is imperative to emphasize that the empirical findings of this paper do not imply that the
financial crises of the 1990s were entirely the result of fickle capital flows and nervous investors. It would
be wrong to deny that countries that were hit by recent crises were vulnerable and showed weaknesses in
their economic foundations. It would be equally wrong, however, to deny that rapid capital account
liberalization and the opening to international markets, which lead to increased real and financial
interdependence among emerging markets, played a crucial role in explaining both the timing as well as
the severity of those crises.
The central lesson from the findings of this paper is that no open emerging market, even one with
relatively sound fundamentals and policies, is capable of insulating itself from events in the rest of the
world. The powerful role of contagion suggests that the most effective measures for crisis prevention and
resolution require a global, coordinated policy approach. Only few such policy proposals, such as calls for
the creation of a global lender of last resort, the imposition of certain capital controls, contingency funds
and debtor-in-possession financing (e.g. Eichengreen et al. 1995, Radelet and Sachs 1999, Rodrik 1998),
have been implemented so far. Therefore, the difficult challenge still faced by emerging markets is how
best to reap the benefits of a more open economy while minimizing the risk of becoming the victim of a
potentially devastating financial crisis inherent in the liberalization process.27
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APPENDIX: DATA DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES
Country Sample
The 24 countries of the sample are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru,
Venezuela, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Jordan, Poland, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey.
Fundamentals
The set of fundamentals covers a fairly wide range of variables, many of which have been mentioned in
the academic literature as potential culprits for some currency crisis or another. Kaminsky, Lizondo, and
Reinhart (1997) provide a comprehensive review of empirical work on currency crises and emphasize the
lack of empirical consensus on what may cause crises. The empirical analysis starts from a broad
approach by including a wide range of variable definitions in order to avoid ignoring potentially powerful
factors in the analysis.
•  Foreign debt: total foreign debt/GDP, total short-term debt/GDP, and short-term debt/total foreign
debt. Source: IMF/WB/OECD/BIS joint publication.
•  Capital inflows: total capital inflows/GDP, short-capital inflows/GDP and short-term to total capital
inflows. Source: IMF.
•  Trade balance: (exports+imports)/GDP and current account. Source: IMF.
•  Overvaluation of exchange rate: real effective exchange rate (REER) relative to 1990, and the change
in REER during the prior one or two years. Source: JP Morgan.
•  Foreign exchange reserves: ratio of total foreign exchange reserves to either M2 or to imports.
Source: IMF.
•  Lending boom: rate of credit expansion to the private sector relative to GDP. Source: IMF.
•  Government deficit/GDP and government debt/GDP. Source: IMF.
•  Changes in interest rates and growth rates in industrial countries. Source: IMF.
•  US$ exchange rate changes to Japanese yen and German mark. Source: IMF.
Exogenous Variable
•  Exchange Market Pressure (EMP): definition in text. Source: IMF and national central banks.31
Contagion Variables
•  Real Integration Contagion: definition in text. Source: World Trade Analyzer (1989-97); commodities
measured at the 3-digit SITC level, excluding agriculture and natural resources.
•  Common Bank Lender: definition in text. Source: BIS/OECD/WB/IMF Joint Database.































FINCORR1 0.012 0.103 1
FINCORR2 -0.030 0.086 0.641 1
Note: See equations (10), (11), (13) and (14) for definitions of the contagion variables.
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